NTSB: Crew sleeping at time of collision
EMERSON - A one-year investigation into a fatal $8 million train collision in Montgomery County revealed the conductor and engineer had fallen asleep.
Details of the report were presented at a National Transportation Safety Board meeting April 24 in Washington D.C.
“Based on the conductor's and engineer's irregular work schedules, medical conditions, and their lack of action before the collision, staff concluded both crewmembers had fallen asleep due to fatigue,” Dr. Steve Jenner reported to the NTSB.
With Tom Anderson as the engineer and Patricia Hyatt as the conductor, the 130-car coal train collided with a stationary train hauling equipment eight miles west of Red Oak. Operating in a restricted speed zone of 20 miles per hours, the coal train collided with the stationary one at 23 mph, without the breaks being applied.
Anderson and Hyatt, both 48, arrived to work about 2:30 a.m., more than four hours before the collision. They both had been off duty 12 hours and one minute before getting called in to work, one minute more than federal regulations require.
According to their medical records, both Anderson and Hyatt had body mass indexes at the obese level along with other conditions such as high blood pressure making them high at-risk candidates for sleep disorders. Hyatt in fact was being treated for insomnia and restless leg syndrome.
“Crew had ample opportunity to slow and stop their train,” Dr. Jenner said when explaining why he believes the crew was asleep when the collision occurred. “The rear of the standing train could be seen clearly 46 seconds before the collision but the crew made no effort to slow or stop the train.”
Jenner also said the crew's irregular shift schedules would have contributed to their fatigue levels.
“It is very difficult, if not impossible to get into a regular sleep schedule with his kind of irregular work schedule,” he said. “The human body wants to sleep at night and be active during the day and the best we can, we prepare for that kind of lifestyle. When the work schedules are flip-flopping around, our bodies can't adjust. It takes a lot of time. But this is even a worse scenario. When you are flip-flopping around schedules, the body can't adjust to it.”
Alerter System
Investigators also discussed the train's alerter system, which is designed to help prevent these types of accidents.
Operations Group Chairman Ted Turpin said the train was equipped with an alert system that once sounded, gave the crew 24 seconds to reset it or the train's brakes would automatically be applied.
Turpin said there alert can be reset by adjusting the throttle, applying brakes or by pressing a reset button.
The striking train's alerter had sounded twice just before the collision and was reset each time by pressing the reset button.
The alerter was scheduled to sound again seven seconds before the collision.
Turpin stated it was obvious the existing alerter system does not prevent all fatigue and sleep related accidents.
“We have concluded engineers reset alerters like they would a snooze button,” Turpin said. “Alerts only detect engineer inactivity and are not an effective fatigue management system.”
Under Federal Rail Administration regulations, trains that share a line with a passenger train, as this one does, are required to install Positive Train Control (PTC) technology. PTC allows for control of the train from a remote location to prevent collisions as well as enforce speed limits, incursions into work zones and movement through a misaligned switch.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe, which operates this portion of rail, has not installed their PTC system yet, but plans to by the 2015 deadline.
However, Signal Chairman Timothy DePaepe said had the currently required PTC system been installed, it would not have prevented this accident.
One reason is the speed restrictions imposed would not have resulted in the brakes being applied until the train is six miles over the speed limit.
The colliding train was only three miles over at the time of the accident.
Secondly, DePaepe explained the PTC system required by regulations does not identify the rear of a train as a possible target, only the front of an oncoming one.
“PTC with rear-end train identification would have prevented this accident,” DePaepe told the board.
Board Vice Chair Christopher Hart noted the discrepancy in identifying the front of the train but not the rear in an effort to prevent accidents. He asked if the technology was available to do so.
“They are just going to do what is required of them in the (Railway Safety) Act and this is not required,” Investigator-in-Charge Mike Flanigon said. “The technology is there. They can already identify the end of train device. It could be easily done but there is a cost involved.”
Addressing Fatigue
Jenner said BNSF has an online training program de-signed to teach engineers and conductors about the dangers of fatigue while assessing their risk for sleeping disorders.
“It's a good program,” Jenner said. “It is an opportunity to do some real assessment and be prompted to take further action.”
However, of the railroad's 20,000 engineers and conductors, less than two percent had completed the voluntary program. Jenner said neither Hyatt nor Anderson took part, but if they had, they would have been identified as high risk for a sleeping disorder.
“This is a great example if you make it optional, only two percent will participate in it,” Board Member Mark Rose-kind said. “Had they completed it, at least they would have had the information to possibly seek treatment.”
Hart questioned why the fatigue issue keeps coming up in rail, maritime, highway and aviation accidents.
“It is very frustrating to me we are fighting this battle separately in every mode,” he said. “Are the people in DOT comparing notes when it comes to this problem and what can the NTSB do to bring this together so everybody isn't reinventing this wheel separately?”
